The Missing Currency of Israeli/Palestinian Negotiations
Americans. First, the principal duty of a state is to protect its citizens;
the niceties of sovereignty be damned. Second, the reciprocity of recognized sovereignty requires that Canada do as much or more than the United States would do to protect American lives and property.
That is, the United States' sufferance of a sovereign nation to its north is conditioned on that nation policing its residents and borders in the interest of the United States. To the extent that it fails to do so it forfeits its claim that its sovereignty be respected. This proposition, neither obscure nor controversial, is a recognized core principle of international law.
The great eighteenth century scholar Emer de Vattel wrote:
Whoever wrongs the State, violates its rights, disturbs its peace, or injures it in any manner whatever becomes its declared enemy and is in a position to be justly punished. Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which must protect its citizens. The sovereign of the injured citizen must avenge the deed and, if possible, force the aggressor to give full satisfaction or punish him, since otherwise the citizen will not achieve the chief end of civil society, which is protection.
… And since the sovereign should not permit his subjects to trouble or injure the subjects of another State, much less to be so bold as to offend a foreign [A]ssuming the facts that the Caroline had been engaged, and when she was seized by us was still engaged, in carrying supplies and military stores from the American side of the river to the rebels in Navy Island, part of British territory; that this was permitted, and could not be prevented, by the American authorities, I was clearly of the opinion that, although she lay on the American side of the river when she was seized, we had a clear right to seize and destroy her, just as we might have taken a battery erected by the rebels on the American shore, the guns of which were fired against the Queen's troops in Navy Island.
The hypothetical of loyalists attacking Americans from Canada is a useful vehicle for capturing the fatally missing element in the grand farrago of a "Peace Process" based on an exchange of "land for peace."
These two comforting tropes have a surface appeal but ultimately represent a fantasy rather than a realistic approach to the problem.
The vision they attempt to convey is a process of negotiation between Israel and the Arabs in which land in the disputed territories is gradually transferred to Arab control and ultimate sovereignty in exchange for an ever more secure peace for Israel.
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The dewy-eyed version of this entails both sides coming to see To all too many who view the Arab-Israeli peace process from a safe distance, and alas even for some who have a closer view but who are in the thrall of a "lust for peace," 8 this requirement seems a trivial hurdle; they envision a clear win-win solution. 9 Unfortunately that view is thoroughly mistaken. Rather than trivial, the hurdle is insurmountable.
The most powerful evidence of the wrong-headedness of the underlying theory of the Peace Process and its land-for-peace formula is its failure to achieve anything of substance indeed to have increased instability and violence despite the years of exertion 10 and billions of dollars spent in the effort to achieve success. 11 After all, there have been extensive face to face contacts for over a decade, 12 any number of proposals 13 and interim agreements, 14 and financial support from third parties. 15 If some sort of a deal were so clearly in both parties interest it would have come to fruition long ago.
Why is the overwhelming evidence of this fundamental error not recognized? The first and facile move when confronted by the failure of a pet theory is not to abandon the theory but rather to assume or hypothesize that there was some small rectifiable failure in its execution. So in this case we hear that: Arafat miscalculated his bargaining strength; 16 or the Israelis needed to be just a bit more generous and forthcoming; 17 or the Americans were not playing their proper role. 18 Surely one of these explanations must be at play. After all, the logic of the deal is so compelling-or so it seems to the outsiders. For an agreement to work the Arabs must want to create a Palestinian nation-state with sufficient passion that they are willing not merely to surrender dreams of destroying Jewish sovereignty over
Israel, but even more than that, that they are willing to make their own state an instrument of securing that Jewish sovereignty. That is they must be the aggressive magistrate on behalf of Jewish interests.
Given that for the foreseeable future there will be large numbers of violent irredentists among the Arab community the Palestinian state must root them out, disable them, incarcerate them and execute them-wholesale periodically, retail routinely.
That is the currency that the Arabs must bring to the At a minimum, then, the sovereignty that the Palestinians must exercise to preserve a state, if they ever achieve the formal outlines of one, is one in which they exercise it on behalf of core Israeli interests.
But the issue will likely never reach that point unless the Israelis retreat once more to the addled position they followed for much of the To explicitly state the requirement for the peace process to succeed is to pull back the curtain from the charade/fantasy/kabuki of the peace process. The requirement on the Palestinian Authority of serving as Israel's policeman will seem obvious to some readers. So, something will eventually happen between the Israelis and the Arabs to end the current impasse. Perhaps the Israelis will lose heart and move to Los Angeles. More likely, I think, the Arabs will eventually wake up and become a modern people no longer obsessed with suppressing Jewish national aspirations. But whatever happens it will require a deep change of heart to bring about a resolution to this problem and no amount of rushing to a solution will hasten it, indeed forcing a solution where there is none is more likely to retard its eventual achievement. See, for example, Herbert C. Kelman, "Building a Sustainable Peace, The Limits of Pragmatism in the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no.1 (1998): 10, 13-15 (arguing that one of four "key ideas" necessary to move to a "principled peace" is the "mutual acknowledgement of the other's nationhood and humanity" -see p.10 -which the author expands upon, noting the steps each side must take to communicate a respect and acknowledgement of the other's humanity and national identity).
See also Sami Adwan and Dan Bar-On, "Shared History Project: A PRIME Example of Peace-Building Under Fire," International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 17, no. 4 (2004): 513, 516, 521 (arguing that an essential element of peace is the bottom-up process of peace building, which necessarily involves face-to-face meetings as a step toward acknowledging and respecting the other. The article makes this argument as it presents a summary of an educational exchange in which Palestinian and Israeli teachers collaborated to draft a dual-narrative textbook to expose their students to the narratives of the "other").
See The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has characterized the Palestinians as "the largest per capita recipients of foreign aid worldwide." Since the Oslo Accords
